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The Political Offense Exception And
Terrorism
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER*
In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro hijacking the United States
sought to utilize its bilateral extradition treaties with Italy and Yugosla-
via to obtain the provisional arrest of the hijacker's commander, the Pal-
estinian terrorist Mohammed Abbas. These efforts were to no avail, and
the American people were rightly disappointed by this failure of the in-
ternational extradition process.
Most Americans would be shocked to learn that, in several instances,
our own nation has refused to extradite terrorist fugitives to our demo-
cratic allies. In the last few years, the United Kingdom has requested the
extradition of fugitives accused of crimes ranging from murder to bomb-
ing, but federal courts have denied the requests on the ground that these
terrorists had committed "political" offenses that were exempt from
extradition.
Decisions such as these have led the U.S. Government to initiate ne-
gotiations with several of our extradition treaty partners. The first prod-
uct of those negotiations, a revision of our treaty with the United King-
dom, was recently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
This Supplementary Treaty is a necessary modification of our extradition
practice, and is an important step in the legal battle against terrorism.
The Supplementary Treaty amends the extradition treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom.' It explicitly identifies par-
ticular crimes - such as airplane hijacking and murder of diplomats -
that should no longer be regarded as "political offenses." The Supplemen-
tary Treaty recognizes that no criminal who commits these specified acts
of violence and destruction should be immune from extradition merely
because he was acting to advance a political objective.
The political offense exception is a long standing doctrine with noble
intentions. The concept has been incorporated into many United States
extradition treaties.2 But the overbroad application of any concept -
however enlightened- can lead to foolish and anti-social results. The po-
* Judge Sofaer is Legal Adviser to the Department of State. The author would like to
thank Steven T. Catlett, of his staff, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
2. See, e.g., Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 26, 1901,
United States-Belgium, 32 Stat. 1894, T.S. No. 409; Treaty of Extradition, May 6, 1931,
United States-Greece, 47 Stat. 2185, T.S. No. 855; Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 3, 1978,
United States-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 892, T.I.A.S. No. 9625.
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litical offense exception to extradition is unfortunately no exception to
this fundamental rule.
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The political offense exception is, above all, an exception. The basic
tradition of international law applicable with respect to fugitives from
justice is one of cooperation between nations to enhance their capacity to
maintain the lawful order and security upon which all liberty ultimately
depends. The oldest known document in diplomatic history - a peace
treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hittusili III,
concluded in 1290 B. C. - provided for the exchange of criminals of one
nation found in the territory of the other. 3 This principle of cooperation
in extraditing fugitives has survived to modern times.
The great 18th century revolutions were based, in part, upon the no-
tion that individuals have the right to engage in revolutionary political
activity in pursuit of liberty. Those were times when today's democracies
were ruled by kings and emperors, when universal suffrage did not exist,
and when the mere open, verbal criticism of a ruler was frequently re-
garded as sedition or treason. In the wake of those revolutions, the emerg-
ing democracies of Western Europe did not want to surrender to foreign
sovereigns' revolutionaries who had committed offenses in the course of
exercising their political rights. The Jacobean Constitution of 1793, re-
flecting this revolutionary spirit, declared that the French people "grant
asylum to foreigners banished from their countries for the cause of free-
dom."' 4 The same sentiment gave rise to the seminal provision in the Bel-
gian extradition law of 1833, which provided that a fugitive "shall not be
prosecuted or punished for any political offense ... nor for any act con-
nected to such crime
From its inception, the political offense exception has been applied
without significant controversy to "pure" political offenses, which are
those directly related to the security of the state: sedition, treason and
the like. Governments and courts have had little trouble excepting these
offenses from extradition. By contrast, application of the exception to
"relative" political offenses has always been problematic. Relative politi-
cal offenses are common, often violent crimes - such as murder and ar-
son - whose perpetrators nevertheless claim immunity from extradition
because their criminal acts were allegedly committed in the course of a
rebellion or for a political purpose.
Historically, claims of immunity from extradition based on "relative"
3. See Langdon & Gardiner, The Treay of Alliance Between Hittusili King of the Hit-
tites and the Pharaoh Ramses II of Egypt, 6 J. EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179 (1920).
4. French Const. of 1793, art. 120, reprinted in 6 L. DUGUIT, H. MONNIER & R. BON-
NARD, LES CONSTITUTIONS ET LES PRINCIPALES Lois POLITIQUES DE LA FRANCE DEPIus 1789
(6th ed. 1952)(emphasis added).
5. CODES BELGES, 1927 at 1113, 8 BULL. OFF. 1195. See generally Deere, Political Of-
fenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 Am. J. INT'L L. 247, 250-53 (1933).
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political offenses have posed difficulties for civilized nations. For example,
in 1855, a Belgian court invoked the political offense exception to deny a
French request for extradition fo a fugitive who had placed a bomb under
the railway line over which Emperor Napoleon III was traveling.6 This
decision led the Belgian legislature - the country in which the exception
was first codified - to amend the 1833 extradition law to refuse to recog-
nize as political offenses certain common crimes used by terrorists for po-
litical ends. The statute provided:
An attempt (attentat) against the person of the head of a foreign gov-
ernment or against the members of his family, when this attempt con-
stititutes that act of murder, assassination or poisoning, shall not be
considered as a political offense or an act in connection with a politi-
cal offense.7
This provision, known as an "attentat clause", gained widespread accept-
ance as a limitation on the political offense exception.
Courts have continued to grapple with the political offense exception
through the years. For example, in 1891, Britain's Queen's Bench divi-
sional court considered a Swiss extradition request for one Castioni, a fu-
gitive who had shot and killed a State Council member in the course of
an armed attack upon a municipal building. In a landmark decision, the
justices held that a criminal act was not protected under the political of-
fense exception if committed merely "in the course of" a political conflict
or uprising; it must also be done "in furtherance of" a political cause. The
court found that Castioni had acted as a participant in an insurrection,
that the shooting had, in fact, not been an act of personal malice against
the victim. The justices therefore ruled that the offense was political and
denied extradition.' American courts that have recently refused extradi-
tion have relied heavily on the ruling in Castioni.s
Three years after Castioni, however, the British courts refined the
doctrine. The French Government requested extradition of one Meunier,
who had bombed a crowded cafe and an army barracks. Meunier fought
extradition by invoking the political offense exception. Justice Cave held
that, for an offense to be judged political, "there must be two or more
parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their
choice on the other." Meunier, the court found, was an anarchist who was
the enemy of all organized society. Accordingly, he was not subject to the
exception and was ordered extradited. 10
While Castioni, narrowly construed, may have made sense when it
6. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1855, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1 Pasicrisie Beige 115.
7. Deere, supra note 5, at 252.
8. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
9. See, e.g., In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979); see
also Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition,
18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 401 (1979) (criticizing the Magistrate in McMullen because
he "mechanically applied" Castioni).
10. In re Meunier, [18941 2 Q.B. 415.
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was decided, it makes no sense today to deny extradition to a nation such
as Switzerland - with a democratic political system and a fair system of
justice - in such a case involving a man who attempts to impose his will
on the people through murder. If civilized society is to defend itself
against terrorist violence, some offenses committed in or against stable
democracies must fall outside the scope of the exception, even though
they are politically motivated. The Meunier decision represents an early
recognition that legal principles such as the political offense exception are
based on the determination of sovereign nations to refuse, for humane or
ideological reasons, to cooperate with other nations in the enforcement of
criminal statutes. These principles do not create "rights" in the individu-
als who assert them. Each nation must decide how far to extend the doc-
trine based on its own values, and many have refused to shield from jus-
tice individuals who would destroy the freedoms and lives of others to
gain political advantage."
II. ABUSE OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
A few examples should illustrate how some courts have extended the
doctrine too far, and how harmful and unacceptable the results can be. In
1972, two American citizens, Holder and Kerkow, hijacked a domestic
U.S. flight, extorted $500,000 from the airline that owned the plane, and
forced the pilot to fly to Algeria. They were indicted in the United States
for aircraft piracy, kidnapping, and extortion. The United States re-
quested their extradition to stand trial. Although the crimes were extra-
ditable offenses under the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty,12 a French
court denied extradition in 1975. The court noted that, at one point in
the skyjacking, Holder had demanded that the plane be flown to Hanoi.
(He later dropped that demand.) The court held that Holder's invocation
of Hanoi as his destination demonstrated that he had acted out of politi-
cal motive, thus bringing the crimes within the scope of the political of-
fense exception. 13
Another egregious example of overbroad application of the exception
resulted from the 1973 hijacking by five U.S. citizens of a domestic flight.
They demanded and received $1 million in ransom for the passengers'
release and then forced the plane to fly to Algeria. Two of the fugitives
had escaped from prison, where they had been serving sentences for mur-
der and armed robbery. The five fugitives later made their way to France
11. For example, over twenty European nations, including the Republic of Ireland, are
parties to a convention that, inter alia, modifies the political offense exception. See Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed Jan. 27, 1977, entered into force
Aug. 4, 1978, Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
12. See Extradition Convention, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, 37 Stat. 1526, T.S.
No. 561; Supplementary Extradition Convention, Feb. 12, 1970, United States-France, 22
U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075.
13. See E. McDoWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168
(1975).
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and the United States sought their extradition. A French court, however,
refused to extradite. The court accepted the fugitives' claims that they
had hijacked the plane to escape racial segregation in the United States
and that the charges against them constituted political persecution. The
court therefore implicitly held that the skyjacking and extortion were po-
litical offenses. 4
Several court decisions in the United States have applied the politi-
cal offense exception as expansively and unreasonably as it has been ap-
plied against the U.S. by other nations. For example, in Karadzole v. Ar-
tukovic,'5 the Ninth Circuit considered Yugoslavia's extradition request
for one Andrija Artukovic. Artukovic was charged with sending thousands
of civilians to Nazi death camps while he was Minister of the Interior of
the wartime puppet government of Croatia. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that Artukovic should not be extradited. Both
courts held that his crimes were "political". Several recent decisions are
similarly shocking. They all concern Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) fugitives," but the U.S. Government's objections to them are
based on principle, not on an opposition to any particular movement.
One example concerns William Quinn. He was accused of a variety of
crimes, including the placing of bombs in public places (such as a railway
station, a pub, and a restaurant) and the mailing of letter bombs to a
Roman Catholic Bishop, a judge, and a London newspaper. These bombs
caused significant damage. One letter bomb exploded in a judge's face
and a guard who opened another letter bomb lost his left hand. Quinn
was eventually stopped by a policeman in London for questioning about a
burglary. He fled, and another policeman tried to arrest him. Quinn shot
the policeman three times, killing him.
Quinn escaped to the United States, where he was arrested in San
Francisco and his extradition was sought by the United Kingdom. The
evidence of his guilt was overwhelming - his fingerprints were on the
bombs, and the gun that killed the policeman was in his apartment. Nev-
ertheless, in 1983 a federal district court barred Quinn's extradition, rul-
ing that a "political uprising" existed in the United Kingdom and that
Quinn's acts of murder and bombing were "incidental" to that uprising.17
The Ninth Circuit recently vacated this decision and held Quinn extradit-
able.18 But the grounds for the Circuit Court decision are remarkable.
14. See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-
25 (1976).
15. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 355 U.S. 393
(1958). Artukovic was later deported to Yugoslavia to stand trial.
16. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Mackin, Mag. No. 86 Cr.
Misl. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal denied, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen,
Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979); Quinn v. Robinson, No. CV-82-6688
RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated and remanded, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
17. Quinn v. Robinson, No. CV-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated and
remanded, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
18. 783 F.2d at 817.
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The court merely held that the District Court had incorrectly assessed
the scope of the "political uprising", and that it existed only in Northern
Ireland.'9 Quinn's crimes took place in London, hence they could not be
deemed political offenses.2" Thus, Quinn merely chose the wrong location
for his acts. Under the Quinn decision, he, and other PIRA terrorists,
would be free to murder and bomb without losing the potential benefits
of the political offense exception, as long as they did so in Northern
Ireland.
Another example involved Joseph Patrick Doherty, who blasted his
way out of a prison in Belfast and fled to the United States while await-
ing a court's decision on charges of murder, attempted murder, and pos-
session of firearms with intent to endanger life. Doherty was convicted
two days after his escape and the United Kingdom sought his extradition
based upon his conviction and on new charges relating to his escape.
Based on his review of Irish history and politics, a U.S. district judge
concluded that a political conflict existed in Northern Ireland and that
Doherty's offenses had been committed "in the furtherance of that strug-
gle." The judge recognized that: "it would be most unwise as a matter of
policy to extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every
fanatic group or individual with loosely defined political objectives who
commit acts of violence in the name of those so-called political objec-
tives." 12' The judge, nevertheless, drew an exception for the PIRA. After
an analysis of its nature, structure, and the mode of its internal disci-
pline, the court concluded that PIRA has "both an organization, disci-
pline, and command structure that distinguishes it from more amorphous
groups such as the Black Liberation Army or the Red Brigade."' 22 The
judge declared that Doherty's offenses were political and denied
extradition.2 3
What the PIRA and other less structured terrorist groups have in
common is far more significant in applying the political offense exception
than the ways in which they may differ. All of these groups exhibit a
willingness to engage in violence to achieve political ends. Furthermore,
many radical groups in the U.S. and Europe, as well as their attorneys,
would challenge the conclusion that they lack the necessary structure or
would otherwise fail to constitute a rebellious force. Some have thousands
of "fighters", such as the PLO, or supporters, such as the radical religious
groups on the West Bank who have killed and maimed several Arabs.
Others may be smaller, but they are nevertheless organized and have con-
crete political objectives which they seek to achieve by force.
This has led to an intolerable situation. We must not allow our coun-
try to become a haven for criminals who belong to groups that use vio-
19. Id. at 81.
20. Id. at 81-82.
21. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 277.
VOL. 15:1
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION & TERRORISM
lence for political ends against the citizens of other countries - just as we
expect that foreign governments should not harbor terrorists who commit
violence against U.S. citizens.
III. REFORMING THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION
Some commentators assert that reform of the doctrine is not neces-
sary, and maintain that courts already possess adequate doctrinal tools to
prevent terrorists from using the political offense exception as a shield
from justice. They claim, even in the face of decisions like Doherty that
the United States does not extend the political offense doctrine to fugi-
tives who commit "wanton crimes". This so-called wanton crimes excep-
tion originated in Eain v. Wilkes.24 In Eain, the Court held that political
offenses were acts that disrupt the political structure of a State, and not
the social structure that established the government." [Thus] the indis-
criminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected
political act even when the larger "political" objective of the person who
sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian population of a
country.2"
While the Eain decision is certainly a welcome recognition of the
inappropriateness of violence as a political tool in a democracy, any claim
that, after Eain, the United States does not extend the political offense
exception to fugitives who commit "wanton crimes" is misleading and ex-
aggerated for several reasons. First, unfortunately, this decision has not
been followed by other jurisdictions.2 Second, Eain did not hold that at-
tacks on civilians could never fall within the scope of the political offense
exception and did not rule on whether attacks on individual military or
other government personnel, such as policemen, constituted acts that
"disrupt the political structure of a state" and thus were political, or if
they were acts that "disrupt the social structure", and thus not political.
Instead, the Eain court held that under the facts of the case, there were
no direct links between the perpetrator, a political organization's goals,
and the specific act.
Seen in this light, Eain does not support assertions that the United
States does not extend the political offense exception to those committing
wanton crimes. The limited reach of Eain is yet another demonstration of
the necessity for reform of the political offense doctrine.
Reform of the exception can occur in either of two ways: across-the-
board reform through amendment of our extradition statute, or treaty-
24. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 521; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 477 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1984), Reporters' Note 6 (characterizing
Eain as holding "that random acts of terror are not political offenses").
26. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
477 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1984), Reporters' Note 6 (noting that, as of 1984, Eain had not been
uniformly accepted); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (criticizing
Eain).
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by-treaty revision, by amending our extradition treaties with certain
countries. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend our extradi-
tion statute. Such efforts cannot be exclusive. A legislative approach
would be uniform, applicable to our extradition relations with every coun-
try. Uniformity, however, is no advantage in this situation. We currently
have extradition treaties in effect with almost one hundred other nations.
These nations include stable democracies and countries that have suf-
fered instability or have undemocratic regimes.2 7
While it is important to maintain extradition relations with as many
countries as possible, we need not treat every regime identically. Some of
these nations do not permit opponents of the government in power any
lawful means of political dissent. With respect to such countries, the po-
litical offense exception has a greater role to play than with respect to the
stable democracies, where it has unfortunately become a shield behind
which terrorists can hide.
This fundamental difficulty with modifying the exception through
amendment of our extradition statute has led us to pursue a more narrow,
carefully-drawn approach. Instead of across-the-board modification, we
have decided to seek treaty-by-treaty revision. This allows us to tailor the
political offense exception's reach to account for the nature of the country
with which we are dealing. The Supplementary Treaty with the United
Kingdom is the first completed step in this process. The United Kingdom
meets the criteria we have established: its political system is amenable to
redress legitimate grievances and the judicial system provides fair treat-
ment. Obviously other nations offer a similar degree of freedom for peace-
ful political dissent. We are seeking to negotiate limitations of the politi-
cal offense exception with such countries. Moreover, the Supplementary
Treaty makes the political offense exception unavailable only for certain
listed offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and hijacking,
which are not permissible means to express political dissent in a demo-
cratic regime that offers nonviolent alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom
and other modifications of the political offense exception, are important
steps in applying the rule of law to terrorism. Certainly further steps will
be necessary, but we cannot continue to permit our courts to endorse the
use of violence to accomplish political goals. In stable democracies like
the United States and the United Kingdom, there is another way. The
27. See, e.g., Treaty Relating to the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, Dec. 18, 1947,
United States-South Africa, 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243; Extradition Treaty and Accom-
panying Protocol, Nov. 22, 1927, United States-Poland, 46 Stat. 2282, T.S. No.789; Extradi-
tion Treaty, July 23, 1924, United States-Romania, 44 Stat. 2020, T.S. No.713; Convention
Relating to Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No.
5476; Treaty on Extradition, May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay, 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S.
No.7838.
VOL. 15:1
1986 POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION & TERRORISM 133
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, through its modification of the politi-
cal offense exception, will eliminate the availability of the United States
as a haven for those unwilling to use peaceful means. It is also an essen-
tial step to enable us credibly to urge other nations to extradite terrorists
to this country. Thus, revision of the political offense exception and ratifi-
cation of the Supplementary Treaty. is a moral imperative. Without it, we
contribute to the increase in terrorism by providing shelter to its practi-
tioners, and provide a morally deficient example to the other nations of
the world. We must stop letting terrorists get away with murder.
\\,
